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Artificial wombs, birth and ‘birth’: a 
response to Romanis
Nick Colgrove  
ABSTRACT
Recently, I argued that human subjects in 
artificial wombs (AWs) ’share the same moral 
status as newborns’ and so, deserve the 
same treatment and protections as newborns. 
This thesis rests on two claims: (A) subjects 
of partial ectogenesis—those that develop 
in utero for at time before being transferred 
to AWs—are newborns and (B) subjects of 
complete ectogenesis—those who develop in 
AWs entirely—share the same moral status 
as newborns. In response, Elizabeth Chloe 
Romanis argued that the subject in an AW 
is ’a unique human entity…rather than a 
fetus or a newborn’. She provides four lines 
of response to my essay. First, she argues 
that I have ’misconstrued’ what birth is. Once 
we correct that error, it becomes clear that 
subjects of partial ectogenesis have not been 
born. Second, she argues that my claims 
imply that non- implanted embryos (existing 
in vivo) ’would also be “born”’. But that is 
absurd. Third, she claims I fail to ’meaningfully 
respond’ to distinctions she draws between 
subjects of ectogenesis and neonates. Finally, 
she criticises my essay for focusing on subjects 
of AWs rather than focusing on pregnant 
persons (who should be at the ’centre’ of 
debates over AWs). I respond to each of these 
charges. In doing so, I reaffirm that (contra 
Romanis) some subjects of ectogenesis are 
newborns and all subjects of ectogenesis—
even those that have not been born—share 
the same moral status as newborns.
CLAIM (A), BIRTH AND ‘BIRTH’
Previously, I argued that Claim (A) is 
true given how terms like ‘live birth’ are 
defined by the ‘WHO, European Union, 
US Law and international medical commu-
nity’.1 The WHO, for example, defines 
‘live birth’ as
…the complete expulsion or extraction 
from its mother of a product of conception, 
irrespective of the duration of the 
pregnancy, which, after such separation, 
breathes or shows any other evidence of 
life - for example, beating of the heart, 
pulsation of the umbilical cord or definite 
movement of voluntary muscles - whether 
or not the umbilical cord has been cut or 
the placenta is attached. Each product of 
such a birth is considered live born.2
I will call this the conventional defini-
tion of ‘live birth’ given its widespread 
acceptance.i
To satisfy the first part of the conven-
tional definition, a human subject must 
be completely expelled from its mother 
or completely extracted from its mother. 
Either event will do. To satisfy the second 
part, the expelled/extracted subject 
must either breathe or show some other 
‘evidence of life’ (such as ‘beating of the 
heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord’, and 
so on). Any such event suffices. Two ques-
tions, therefore, allow us to determine 
whether or not a human subject, S, has 
undergone the process of live birth:
(Q1) Has S been completely expelled 
or completely extracted from its 
mother?
(Q2) After being completely expelled/
extracted, was S breathing or did S 
exhibit ‘any other evidence of life’?
If we answer Q1 and Q2 affirmatively, 
then S is ‘considered live born’.2
Regarding Q1, subjects of partial 
ectogenesis (PE) have been completely 
extracted from their mothers. Regarding 
Q2, do subjects of PE exhibit any ‘evidence 
of life’? Yes. Romanis observes that artifi-
cial womb (AW) technology is ‘dependent 
on the subject’s heart working with an 
oxygenator’ as it ‘mimics normal placental 
circulation’.3 Put differently, subjects of PE 
have a pulse. This holds even for embryos 
that lack fully developed hearts, as (theo-
retically) AW technology would continue 
the ‘pulsation of the umbilical cord’ arti-
ficially. So, regarding subjects of PE, the 
correct answer to both Q1 and Q2 is ‘yes’. 
Thus, subjects of PE are ‘live born’.
Romanis rejects this conclusion.4 She 
claims that ‘(Colgrove) fails to acknowl-
edge…that this definition’—the same 
definition quoted above—‘delineates 
i Regarding the definition’s ‘widespread 
acceptance’, previously, I claimed that the 
same language is found within US Law, 
endorsed by the European Union and 
so on, and Romanis did not dispute this 
claim.1 4
two events encompassed in the process 
of complete birth: first, the expulsion of 
the entity from a pregnant person, and 
second, the emergence of that entity from 
the process of gestation’.4 The conven-
tional definition mentions the first event. 
It makes no reference to the second. It is 
unreasonable to fault me for ‘failing to 
acknowledge’ something that is not there.4
Romanis continues, however, by 
unpacking an account of ‘birth’ found 
in Greasley’s work (ie, not the conven-
tional definition quoted previously).4 5 
On this alternate definition of ‘birth’, to 
count as ‘live born’, subjects must undergo 
extraction/expulsion from a pregnant 
person and undergo ‘emergence…from 
the process of gestation’.4 Subjects of PE 
satisfy the first requirement but not the 
second. Hence, on Romanis’s account 
of ‘birth’, subjects of PE are ‘born only 
in a geographical sense’ and should ‘be 
described as unborn’ as they have ‘not 
completed all of birth’.4 Put simply, 
Romanis claims that because subjects of 
PE fail to satisfy her own definition of 
‘birth’, Claim (A) is false.
My argument, however, was that 
subjects of PE satisfy the conventional 
definition of ‘live birth’.1 It does not 
matter that subjects of PE fail to satisfy 
some other definition(s). In my original 
essay, I noted that ‘refusing to acknowl-
edge that subjects of partial ectogenesis 
have been born’ will ‘either demonstrate a 
misunderstanding of terms like “live birth” 
or would rely on a highly unconventional 
use of those terms’.1 Romanis’s response 
fails in both ways. That is, her response 
not only relies on an unconventional defi-
nition of ‘birth’ but also confuses it with 
the conventional definition.4 This is made 
especially clear when Romanis claims that 
the details of the alternate definition are 
stated within the conventional definition.4 
They are not.
This aspect of Romanis’s response is 
particularly problematic given that else-
where, she states that Greasley’s ‘argu-
ments about the significance of birth only 
work if “birth” is not defined as emer-
gence from the female body, but rede-
fined as the emergence of a human being 
from the process of gestation…’.6 Here, 
Romanis acknowledges that the definition 
of ‘birth‘ she advances against my essay is, 
in fact, a ‘redefinition’ of the term. And as 
the conventional definition—not an alter-
nate definition—is central to my argu-
ment, Romanis fails to refute it.
CLAIM (B) AND TWO NON SEQUITURS
Next, Romanis rejects Claim (B):
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(Colgrove) posits that the subject of 
PE is born and shares the same moral 
status as a newborn, and thus, we must 
also accept that the subject of (complete 
ectogenesis) has this same status. This 
seems implausible. If entitlement to 
equal treatment comes only from being 
biologically alive and ex utero, this logic 
counterintuitively suggests that a non- 
implanted embryo alive in vivo would also 
be ‘born.’4
Romanis’s conclusion is a non sequitur. If 
entitlement to equal treatment comes from 
being biologically alive and ex utero, it 
follows that non- implanted embryos alive 
in vivo are entitled to equal treatment. It 
does not follow that they have been born.ii
Romanis continues, however, and 
attempts to reverse my argument. She 
argues that ‘intuitively, the subject of CE 
is not born, and thus, if all subjects of the 
technology should be treated the same, 
the subject of PE is not born either’.4 I 
did explicitly affirm the first two claims: 
subjects of CE have not been born and 
subjects of PE and CE should be treated 
equally.1 But Romanis’s conclusion is 
another non sequitur. Whether or not a 
subject has been born is not a matter of 
how it is treated. If Romanis’s account of 
‘birth’ implies otherwise, then that is more 
reason to conclude that the concept of 
‘birth’ her response relies on is an unusual 
one.
‘EVIDENCE OF LIFE’ IS NOT ‘EVIDENCE 
OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY’
Romanis returns to Claim (A), arguing 
that my essay failed to address other ways 
in which subjects in AWs are (supposedly) 
different from neonates. I listed Roman-
is’s distinctions, but ‘merely dismissed’ 
them ‘as irrelevant’.4 Romanis criticises 
my essay on these grounds, given that the 
features in question—which neonates in 
the neonatal intensive care unit possess 
but subjects in AWs lack (supposedly)—
are ‘material to birth’.4
In response, my original dismissal 
of these distinctions is justified. They 
are not relevant to (or ‘material to’) the 
conventional definition of birth. When 
asking whether or not a subject of PE is 
‘live born’, Q1 and Q2 provide all the 
guidance we need. Q1 asks whether the 
subject has been completely extracted (or 
completely expelled) from its mother’s 
ii The claim that my view implies that all ex 
utero human individuals have been born 
is surprising, as I devote a full section to 
explaining why subjects of complete ecto-
genesis have not been born.1
body. It has. And this fact has nothing to 
do with Romanis’s distinctions. Q2 asks if 
the subject exhibits ‘evidence of life’ (eg, 
does it have a heartbeat?). It does. And 
Romanis’s distinctions have nothing to do 
with our ability to answer Q2. Whatever 
work Romanis’s distinctions are doing, 
they have nothing to do with our assess-
ment of whether or not human subjects 
have been born (according to the conven-
tional definition).
Romanis continues, however, by arguing 
that ‘there are two qualities to sufficient 
proof that a human is engaged in the exer-
cise of independent life, and the (subject 
of PE) does not perform any activities of 
these nature’.4 First, they must perform 
activities that demonstrate they ‘are 
suited to…the external environment’ and 
second, they must perform activities that 
‘are exertive’.4 Romanis argues that having 
a heartbeat does not count as an ‘exertive’ 
activity and that ‘it seems absurd to treat 
the primitive signs of life’ like a heart beat 
‘as evidence of self- sufficiency’.4 When 
advancing this argument, it seems she is 
claiming that subjects of PE do not show 
any ‘evidence of life’ relevant to Q2 and 
so, should not be considered ‘live born’.
Again, Romanis is substituting her own 
account of ‘birth’ for the conventional 
definition. The conventional definition—
quoted above—explicitly includes Roman-
is’s ‘primitive signs of life’ as examples 
of ‘evidence of life’.2 Having a heart-
beat, for example, is explicitly counted 
as ‘evidence of life’. Oddly enough, when 
quoting the WHO definition, Romanis’s 
response omits that portion of the defi-
nition.4 That is, her response leaves out 
the portion of the conventional definition 
that gives examples of features that count 
as ‘evidence of life’.4 Whatever the reason 
for these omissions, if Romanis grants that 
subjects of PE have a heartbeat—which 
she does3 —and maintains that subjects of 
PE do not display any relevant ‘evidence 
of life’, then what her response refers to as 
‘evidence of life’ is different than what the 
conventional definition specifies.
This difference is made more apparent 
given that Romanis’s account of ‘birth’ 
focuses around ‘evidence of self- 
sufficiency’, rather than ‘evidence of life’.4 
The latter—not the former—is what is 
relevant to the conventional definition. 
Whether or not, subjects of PE exhibit 
‘evidence of self- sufficiency’ is, therefore, 
irrelevant.
Romanis may object: if we think 
‘evidence of life’ includes things like 
‘having a heartbeat’, then we will fail to 
recognise a distinction between ‘living 
human tissue and an organically integrated 
live human entity’.4 An embryo may expe-
rience ‘brain death’, for instance, while 
its ‘organs remain sufficiently live for 
harvesting’.4 And ‘it seems hardly intuitive 
to consider these tissues “actively alive”’.4
One wonders: if an anencephalic infant 
is extracted from its mother’s womb and 
maintains a heartbeat throughout the 
process (even with technological aid), is it 
‘hardly intuitive’ to describe it as having 
been ‘born alive’? It probably depends 
on who you ask. But medical experts 
routinely refer to these subjects as ‘born 
alive’.7 It would be surprising to learn 
that these professionals (routinely) fail to 
notice that what they are saying is ‘hardly 
intuitive’.
Further, suppose Romanis is right and 
the conventional definition has counterin-
tuitive implications. This may suggest the 
conventional definition needs revision.iii 
But this line of response fails to address 
the arguments in my original essay.1 
Claim (A) is that subjects of PE satisfy 
the conventional definition of ‘live birth’. 
Whether or not subjects of PE satisfy 
the conventional definition is a different 
question than whether or not the conven-
tional definition requires revision. I was 
careful to draw this distinction, noting 
that ‘maybe we should redefine what it 
means to be born…but that discussion 
moves us beyond the scope of this essay’.1 
Romanis’s response fails to mention the 
distinction. Rather, her response raises 
(potential) problems for the conventional 
definition as though doing so constitutes 
a response to my argument. But even if 
Romanis is right that the conventional 
definition needs revision (which, again, I 
do not think it does), her response ignores 
the limitations I deliberately placed on the 
scope of my essay.
THE CENTER OF THE DEBATE?
Finally, Romanis claims that ‘attempting 
to reduce the debate about AWs to a ques-
tion of moral status frames AWs as some-
thing that only concerns the developing 
human entity’.4 I never claimed that my 
original essay or the issues in it would 
address all questions in debates over AWs. 
Nor did I make any attempt to reduce 
these debates to a single factor. The title 
of my original essay—‘The Subjects of 
Ectogenesis…’—clearly indicated that the 
focus of that essay was subjects of AWs. 
There are no claims (even implicitly) that 
iii To be clear, I do not think there is suffi-
cient reason to motivate our revising the 
conventional definition. But that is an 
argument for another time.
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we should reduce debates over AWs down 
to questions about subjects of AWs (or 
their moral status). So, even if Romanis’s 
claim is correct—in that we should not 
reduce the relevant debates to a single 
factor—this point has nothing to do with 
my arguments.
Relatedly, Romanis asserts that debates 
over AWs should focus on pregnant 
persons (rather than the subjects of AWs).4 
Does this mean that all essays on AWs 
should ‘centre on’ pregnant persons? My 
essay failed to do so.1 But Romanis’s essays 
have as well (on multiple occasions).3 4 
So, it seems unlikely that Romanis means 
that all essays on AWs should centre on 
pregnant persons. If Romanis’s point is 
that debates over AWs should generally 
focus on pregnant persons (rather than 
other subjects), we can debate whether or 
not that claim is plausible. Certainly, we 
can agree that the debates are complex, 
and it would be a mistake to neglect 
paying adequate attention to all affected 
parties. But this discussion pushes us into a 
different direction altogether; one having 
nothing to do with my argument that 
subjects of ectogenesis are—or, at least, 
should be treated as—newborns.
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